Neoliberal Transformation and the Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt by Pfeifer, Karen
Smith ScholarWorks 
Economics: Faculty Publications Economics 
2016 
Neoliberal Transformation and the Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt 
Karen Pfeifer 
Smith College, kpfeifer@smith.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pfeifer, Karen, "Neoliberal Transformation and the Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt" (2016). Economics: 
Faculty Publications, Smith College, Northampton, MA. 
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs/25 
This Book Chapter has been accepted for inclusion in Economics: Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of Smith ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@smith.edu 
Neoliberal Transformation and the Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt 
Karen Pfeifer 
 
24 September 2014, Working Draft of Chap 1 in 
Reflections on the Political Economy of Socio-Economic Change  
in the Middle East and North Africa: Gender Perspectives and Survival Strategies 
Roksana Bahramitash and Hadi Esfahani, eds., Palgrave, forthcoming 
 
Overview 
 
By the lights of the international financial institutions, Tunisia and Egypt were the 
celebrated success stories of the Washington Consensus, or neoliberal reform, in the Arab 
Mediterranean and participated fully in the worldwide economic boom of the 2000-2008 period. 
Neoliberalism promised to shrink government and promote private enterprise as the engine of 
growth and new job creation. While fewer resources were provided to public investment and 
services like health and education, private investment did not fully compensate, even as most 
benefits of growth, liberalization and privatization were concentrated in the hands of a class of 
crony capitalists led by the ruling families. Throughout the 2000s, the underside of neoliberal 
growth became more glaring, including capital flight, the limited contributions of FDI and open 
trade to domestic development, growing regional disparities, multidimensional poverty, 
multidimensional inequality, and malfunctions of the labor market. 
Social movements grew in opposition to this neoliberal polity and economy among both 
the middle and working classes. When the economic crisis of 2008-2010 caused a slowdown in 
economic growth and aggravated unemployment and poverty, the opposition movements grew 
stronger and more interconnected. To hold power, the ruling elite intensified electoral fraud and 
the often-brutal repression of opposition movements. The final insult was the maneuvering by 
the ruling families to convert their presidential systems to dynastic rule. By the end of 2010, 
these forces converged into a perfect storm that led to the overthrow of Presidents Ben Ali and 
Mubarak. 
 
 
The IFIs’ Approach through 2010: Neoliberal Reform 
 
 Egypt and Tunisia were vaunted stars of neoliberal reform in the Arab World from the 
1990s through 2010. They were praised for the policy changes they undertook under the 
guidance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (the international financial 
institutions, or IFIs), aid agencies such as USAID, and the European Union’s Mediterranean 
Partnership Agreements. Following standard “Washington Consensus” advice, IMF-supervised 
stabilization programs supported monetary policy that reined in the money supply, raised interest 
rates toward international market levels, and curbed inflation. Structural adjustment programs 
supervised by the World Bank and other western agencies supported shrinking of the financial, 
regulatory and productive roles of the state in the economy, reduction of public spending, 
liberalization of international trade and investment, and privatization of publicly-owned 
enterprises and public services. With little concern for political autocracy and repression, the IFIs 
heaped praise on the acceleration of privatization in the 2000s, the growth of exports, especially 
manufactured exports, overall economic growth, and a sharp rise in foreign direct investment, as 
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seen for example in IMF consultation reports from the last boom year before the financial crisis 
struck (IMF 2007a: 3; IMF 2007b:3).
1
 Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the rates of real aggregate and 
per capita GDP growth and Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the sources of foreign exchange revenues 
and growing shares of exports and FDI through 2008. Figures 3a and 3b indicate that Egypt and 
Tunisia were paying down external debt and reducing their debt service burdens, and their 
current accounts were either in surplus or had small deficits through 2009, as shown in Figure 4. 
[Figures 1a and 1b] 
 While the IFIs took credit for these macroeconomic successes, the agencies, as well as 
many academics, continued to admonish the governments of Tunisia and Egypt for not doing 
enough to pursue economic liberalization, to provide transparency and accountability in 
regulation and taxation, to reduce corruption, and to remove obstacles for establishing and 
expanding business whether by domestic or foreign capital. The IFIs attributed these weaknesses 
to defects of internal policy on the parts of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments, treating 
some features as benighted holdovers from the statist era – such as relatively more secure 
employment and compression of wages in the public sector, guaranteed pensions, and ongoing 
subsidies for foodstuffs and energy – and treating other features as foot-dragging on “reform,” 
for example, not reducing remaining barriers to trade and foreign investment fast enough, or not 
removing state influence and regulation from the financial sector and too slowly privatizing 
production of infrastructure and other public goods like education, healthcare, utilities and 
energy (IMF 2007a: 3; IMF 2007b:3). 
[Figures 2a and 2b] 
 IMF consultation reports from 2010 evaluated the impact of the global crisis and 
recession, despite the irony that what the agency had long viewed as insufficient efforts to shrink 
the role of the government had turned out to be beneficial to the Egyptian and Tunisian 
economies. In the face of recession, these governments pursued stimulatory fiscal and monetary 
policies, which had cushioned the blows given the relative insulation of their domestic markets 
and banking sector from the international system. The crisis was imposed by exogenous shocks, 
including sharp declines in the demand for exports and inflows of foreign direct investment, and, 
to a lesser and briefer extent, in tourism receipts and remittances (see Figures 2a and 2b). Yet 
these 2010 reports went on to recommend more of the same reforms as in 2007, as though the 
previous two decades of reducing barriers to foreign trade and investment were not relevant to 
understanding the impact of the shocks (IMF 2010a: 3; IMF 2010b: 3). 
[Figures 3a and 3b]  
  IFI and Western development agencies did not take responsibility for the negative socio-
economic features of neoliberal transformation or acknowledge the negative political features of 
these autocracies until the spring of 2011. They left violations of civil and political liberties and 
human rights to be treated separately and addressed, if at all, by NGOs and United Nations 
agencies. While such problems were written up in annual US State Department and EU human 
rights surveys (e.g., U.S. Department of State 2009), these regimes were considered dependable 
allies of Western Europe and the United States, leading the latter simply to admonish them with 
                                                 
1
 Similar praise came from the World Bank, again with little or no reference to the political regime. Such studies 
include Tunisia: Understanding Successful Socioeconomic Development (Hassan 2005), Intègration Mondiale de la 
Tunisie: Une Nouvelle Gènèration de Rèformes pour Booster la Croissance et l’Emploi (World Bank 2008), Doing 
Business in the Arab World 2009, which mentions Egypt favorably several times and includes its property 
registration reform as a case study (World Bank 2008: 47-49), and Doing Business in Egypt 2008 (World Bank 
2007). Similar evaluations and recommendations also came from Europe (for example, Kauffman and Wegner 
2007) and from the interArab investment promotion agency (Dhaman 2007). 
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words, as they did with their Gulf monarchy allies, without imposing economic sanctions or 
military penalties like they did on non-favored regimes in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.  
[Figure 4] 
 The IFIs treated inequality and poverty in the countryside as indigenous problems unto 
themselves – unconnected to the neoliberal agenda – to be addressed separately through 
programs promoting access to microfinance, vocational training and “modernization” of 
agriculture. The IFIs came to view unemployment as an increasingly incorrigible problem in the 
2000s, but did not consider it to be an aspect of neoliberal policies or outcomes, for example as a 
demand-side problem due to the nature of FDI or domestic investment. Rather, they attributed 
unemployment to labor market rigidities and an educational system that awarded credentials to 
the growing legions of high school and college graduates allegedly without providing them with 
the skills appropriate to the needs of private sector employers. Other socio-economic problems 
were ignored, such as the blossoming of a wealthy and powerful capitalist class deeply 
connected to the highest levels of the state and the regime, capital flight, a dearth of domestic 
investment, the risks of overdependence on foreign direct investment and external markets, and 
the uneven distribution of the benefits of growth and the costs of crisis among regions and social 
groups.  
 
 
Blossoming of a Wealthy, Powerful Capitalist Class in a Corrupt State 
 
A privileged business elite had grown to operate behind protective barriers in the 
interstices of the state-led economy in Egypt and Tunisia in the post-independence era. During 
the neoliberal era, subsets of both public sector managers and the elite merged into a new 
capitalist class that benefited from the opening to foreign trade and investment and the 
privatization of state enterprises as part of neoliberal economic reform.
2
 
In Egypt, the infitah of the 1970s and 1980s had allowed more space for these capitalists 
to expand, some to become successful exporters, others importers or agents of foreign firms, but 
most remained oriented toward the domestic economy and were well-integrated with the network 
of bureaucrats and public enterprise directors who ran the core of the economy. When 
privatization got under way in the 1990s, these two groups together, sometimes in competition 
and sometimes in cooperation, were well positioned to become the new owners, a pod of Nile 
“whales” that turned public monopolies into private monopolies or oligopolies. The leaders of 
this newly emboldened capitalist class were identifiable by name, and their positions, business 
associations and relationships to the top echelons of the Mubarak regime were known 
(Rutherford 2008: 204-211; Sfakianakis 2004; Mitchell 2002: 282-284).
3
  Two infamous 
examples of privileged transactions without competitive bidding were are the purchase of public 
lands for an elite housing complex by Minister of Parliament Talaat Mustafa, with free state 
provision of needed infrastructure (roads, sewer system, utilities), and the award of the first 
mobile phone license to Naguib Sawiris, part of whose fortune had already come from 
government construction contracts. 
                                                 
2
 See Pfeifer 2012b for a discussion of the process and impact of neoliberal reform and privatization in Egypt, and 
Posusney 2003 for a discussion of privatization and organized labor in Egypt, Tunisia and other Arab countries. 
3
 For exact data on the types and degree of privatization in Egypt and Tunisia and other Mediterranean countries 
prior to the global financial crisis (but not on the capitalists themselves), see Kauffman and Wegner 2007. 
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 Husni Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak, rose to positions of leadership in the ruling 
National Democratic Party (NDP) as a leader of this group and was a strong advocate of further 
liberalization and privatization of the economy. From the mid-1990s, the regime had come to 
favor those members of the business elite who were “younger, often more outward and export-
oriented entrepreneurs … more capable of contributing to growth and employment” and brought 
market-oriented reformer Ahmed Nazif to serve as prime minister in 2004 (Rutherford 2008: 
218-224). The regime then took care in selecting the industries and services for private sector 
participation -- telecom, roads, ports and airports, power plants, cement, automobile assembly (in 
conjunction with foreign capital) and land reclamation and development, as well as agencies 
importing for the public sector – and managing the competition for these plums so as to reward 
some and deny others (Wurzel 2004: 124-125). However, the 2000 and 2005 Parliamentary 
elections indicated that the private capitalist class was growing more autonomous while the the 
NDP’s control was weakening (Soliman 2011: 145-147).4 
Some analysts rationalized these arrangements on the argument that obstacles to growth 
could be overcome by an at least temporary alliance of top policy makers and important 
investors, because pro-business reforms at the national level were insufficient in and of 
themselves to break the “binding constraints” on investment and growth, for example in 
constructing the communications and internet technology sector in Egypt from scratch (Abdel-
Latif and Schmitz 2011; 2010).  If formal legal and financial institutions were weak, corruption 
and informal insider relationships could make up for this deficit in the short run and stimulate 
private investment, albeit at the risk of undermining confidence and investment in the long run 
(Ghecham 2010). A third analyst of corporate governance in Egypt found that the increasing 
concentration of ownership in privatized firms over time, especially if foreign investors were 
involved, improved firm performance, as measured by returns to assets or equity, and advised 
against SOEs being sold to their employees or kept under even partial control of the state (Omran 
2009). 
While the rationale for such arguments conformed to the ends targeted by neoliberal 
policies, the means contravened neoliberalism’s ideological commitment to the level playing 
field, easy of entry into industries, and free competition. In practice, competition was shaped and 
constrained by public policy, leading to concentration of economic power. Stock market 
capitalization in Egypt rose from 35.6 to 105 percent of GDP from 2000 to 2007, but the share of 
the formal private sector in GDP actually decreased from 70.7 to 62.3 percent, and the number of 
companies listed and traded on the stock exchange fell by about 50 percent (American Chamber 
of Commerce in Egypt 2008). Egyptian companies’ participation in international mergers and 
acquisitions peaked in 2008, with $16 million in sales but just $4.6 million in purchases 
(UNCTAD 2011). Listings on the Cairo and Alexandria stock exchanges continued to decline 
during the financial crisis and recession, from 435 firms in 2007 to 212 in 2010 (Dhaman 2011, 
2010, 2009: Table 10).  
A parallel scenario played itself out in Tunisia over these decades, but, unlike Egypt, the 
protected domestic bourgeoisie was less a carry-over from the colonial era and more a creation 
                                                 
4
 An example of this tension arose in 2002. In response to IFI pressure to open its markets further to foreign capital 
and trade and to respect intellectual property rights, Egypt passed a law protecting foreign patent holders, with the 
exception that it could license local production of generics that were essential to health. After Pfizer Corporation 
won approval to establish a factory to produce Viagra in Egypt, local manufacturers were able to pressure the 
Ministry of Health to grant an “exception” for them to produce it too, in the interests of protecting the health of poor 
people. Pfizer halted construction and withdrew entirely from the Egyptian market (Bird and Cahoy 2008: 225-226).  
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of independent state-led development under Bourguiba. Liberalization took place mostly in the 
form of export enclaves, where foreign capital reigned and a privileged part of domestic capital 
was allowed to come on board as junior partners. When the mise-à-niveau (industrial upgrading) 
program was introduced in the 1990s, a partially-successful project much praised by the IFIs, the 
regime used cronyism and its own judgment in deciding which firms could participate and what 
kind of assistance they could obtain (Hibou 2006: 189-190; 194-196). The domestic capitalist 
class was not as well organized as in Egypt and could not command the kind of attention and 
respect that the export sector enjoyed (Cammett 2007: chapters 3 and 5). To the extent that the 
Tunisia model worked to promote investment, growth and employment, it was based on an East-
Asian state-led pattern, overlaid with a belated, gradual and controlled set of neoliberal reforms 
(Harrigan and El Said 2010).  
Before the uprising began in late 2010, astute scholars predicted that the internal 
contradictions of Tunisia’s particular form of authoritarian neoliberalism would lead to political 
resistance (Harrigan and El-Said 2010: 21-22; Hibou 2006). The achievements of the mise-à-
niveau program were significant, but constrained by external factors, such as the abolition of the 
Multifibre Accords in 2006, and by growing resentment toward the regime’s patrimonialism and  
“lack of accountability to public scrutiny and political challenge” (Murphy 2006: 536). By the 
late 2000s, the formal system had become dysfunctional and alienating for many domestic 
investors (BTI 2012: 29-32, 39). Many firms chose to operate in the informal sector instead, 
where they were less likely to have their property and contract arrangements undermined and 
where they did not have to pay exorbitant bribes or arbitrarily imposed taxes (Delavallade 2008). 
Whereas the formal sector had grown relative to the informal sector from 1980 to 1995, when the 
latter was 12 percent of GDP, the trend was reversed from 1995 to 2009, with the informal sector 
growing to 29 percent (Abid and Ben Salha 2013: 202). 
 Popular resentment also formed around concentration of economic power through 
“corruption and the monopolization of wealth by ‘clans’ close to Ben Ali” (Hibou 2006: 197). As 
of 2010, the Ben Ali Family controlled one-third of the Tunisian economy, including key sectors 
of banking, telecom, import-export, autos, agriculture and food distribution, petroleum, tourism, 
and real estate. Tunisian protesters became enraged at the great wealth and lavish lifestyle of 
President Ben Ali’s second wife, Leila Trabelsi, and her extended family, most notably their son-
in-law, the billionaire businessman Mohamed Sakher El-Materi. WikiLeaks published a cable 
online that caused great public outrage, in which the US ambassador described a dinner at the 
president’s “beachfront compound decorated with Roman artifacts; ice cream and frozen yoghurt 
flown in from St. Tropez, France; a Bangladeshi butler and South African nanny; and a pet tiger 
in a cage.”5 
 In both Egypt and Tunisia, the public was distressed over the lack of accountability and 
transparency of the regimes. In Egypt, revenues from the Suez Canal went into a separate budget 
controlled by the president’s office, while the military’s massive budget and economic empire 
were totally beyond scrutiny. In Tunisia, a National Solidarity Fund (“26-26”) had been founded 
by Ben Ali in 1993 ostensibly as a rural development program for public goods like electricity, 
roads, and health clinics, to be funded out of the state budget plus “contributions” from the 
public, including civil servants, farmers, business owners, and trade unions. However, the public 
perceived the funds to be distributed in an unfair, clientelist manner, the work done to be shoddy, 
when done at all, and the fund’s income and spending unaccounted for and reputedly pocketed 
                                                 
5
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12302659 
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by the Ben Ali clan (Kallander 2011).
6
 Instead of solving economic problems, liberalization 
seemed to have led to powerful and corrupt crony capitalist states that failed to stimulate formal-
sector domestic investment, facilitated capital flight and incurred “odious debt” at the expense of 
the citizenry at large. 
 
 Investment. A study of growth trends in Egypt from 1973 to 2002, broken into three sub-
periods, 1973-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2002, found that the contribution of capital investment 
and total factor productivity growth (TFP) to overall growth were highest in the 1970s. In the 
1980s, the capital investment rate declined and TFP was negative, causing the overall rate of 
economic growth to decline. In the 1991-2002 period, after the SAP was introduced), TFP 
growth was restored to a positive level but capital investment continued to be low, causing 
output growth to remain low. The author expressed the hope that, as promised by the IFI 
advisers, the new round of liberalizing reforms after 2004 would induce a higher level of 
investment and thus boost growth again (Kamaly 2006). 
[Figure 5] 
 As indicated in Figure 5, average annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) decreased 
slightly as a percentage of GDP in both Egypt and Tunisia from the 1990s to the 2000s. Whereas 
the private share of GFCF increased in both cases, it was not enough to compensate for the steep 
fall in public investment. This implies a drag on further growth and development, as productive 
public investment in infrastructure and human development is essential to underpin, and is 
generally complementary to, private investment in developing countries (UNCTAD 2014: 19-
23). Since productivity, as measured by GDP per employed person, rose faster in the 2000s 
boom than previously, as shown in Figure 6, aggregate income must have grown in proportion, 
leading to the question of how it was distributed and used.  
[Figure 6] 
 
 Capital Flight. While the need to rustle up investment from both domestic and foreign 
sources in order to promote growth was officially a top priority of policy makers for the Egyptian 
and Tunisian economies, significant amounts of potentially investible capital were being spirited 
out of these countries every year.
7
 Egypt’s cumulative inflow of FDI from 2000 through 2008 
was $41.8 billion, while its cumulative illicit financial outflow (IFF) was $57.21 billion. That is 
an average of $4.59 billion per year in FDI inflow versus $6.36 billion in illicit outflow, a net 
average outflow of $1.77 billion. Tunisia had a somewhat better, net positive, balance between 
the flows, with a cumulative inflow of FDI for 2000-2008 of $11.78 billion, an average of $1.31 
billion per year, versus a cumulative illicit outflow of  $8.7 billion, an average of $0.97 billion 
per year on average (Dhaman 2011a; Kar and Curcio 2011: 40-41, Table 3; 52-53, Table 7). 
 In general, illicit outflows of capital reduce domestic investment and undermine real 
economic development, worsening unemployment, inequality and poverty. Less obviously but 
equally important, unrecorded inflows that are stashed secretly in a country cannot be taxed for 
                                                 
6
 A Gallup poll of 1000 Tunisian adults in 2009-2010 found rising levels of dissatisfaction with deteriorating 
education, healthcare and other public services, corruption, and weakening prospects for employment and affordable 
housing (John Thorne, “Pre-Revolution Tunisians Were Growing Gloomier, Poll Shows,” The National, 6/27/2011), 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/pre-revolution-tunisians-were-growing-gloomier-poll-shows 
7
 For oil exporters, IFF are based on deductions by strategically placed persons from hydrocarbon  revenues, while 
for more diversified economies, IFF are achieved through trade mispricing (exports priced lower than actual and 
imports priced higher, to hide legitimate profits from taxation) or through underpricing reported imports to obscure 
smuggling (Kar and Curcio 2011: vii-viii, 6-7). 
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public revenue or used as collateral to back development projects when governments issue bonds 
or borrow abroad (Kar and Curcio 2011: 1, 5). Illicit financial flows reflect two critical 
downsides to liberalization, rising income inequality, which provides incentives not to report 
income in order to avoid taxes, and expansion of open trade relative to GDP, which facilitates 
misquoting of prices to hide profits.
8
 
 Other, complementary, research estimated the value of flown capital from North African 
countries for the whole of the 1970 to 2010 period, measured in billions of constant 2010 dollars. 
The total came to $59.7 billion for Egypt and $38.9 billion for Tunisia, equivalent to 27 percent 
of Egypt’s 2010 GDP and 88 percent of Tunisia’s. Assuming that flown capital could have 
earned an interest rate equal to the return on United States Treasury Bills, the authors estimated 
that the compounded loss over those 40 years would come to $110.1 billion for Egypt and $45.2 
billion for Tunisia, compared to a 2010 debt stock of $34.8 billion for Egypt and $21.6 billion for 
Tunisia (Ndikumana and Boyce 2012). Had those funds been used for domestic investment, there 
would have been higher GDP growth and no need to borrow abroad, and even the possibility of 
earning interest rather than paying it out on the international capital markets.  
 
 Debt and Odious Debt. When the IFIs advised deeper budget cuts and more opening to 
international capital in response to the crisis of 2008-2010, popular resistance arose against not 
only austerity but also the implied loss of economic integrity and the concomitant and apparently 
permanent indebtedness that the Egyptian and Tunisian governments incurred in their 
relationships with the IFIs. Popular criticism of international indebtedness from the “50 Years is 
Enough” campaign and the “Dakar Declaration for the Total Unconditional Cancellation of 
African and Third World Debt” in 20009 resonated loudly among activists in Tunisia and Egypt. 
They argued for opening their governments’ books to public scrutiny and for the cancellation of 
the “odious” portion of the debt incurred for the purchase of unneeded military or “security” 
equipment or for the personal enrichment of the regime and its cronies.
10
 This demand was a 
centerpiece of the World Social Forum when it convened in Tunisia in March 2013.
11
 
Cancellation of this part of the debt would reduce the interest costs that eat up a significant part 
of the annual budget in each country and so shrink fiscal and current account deficits (see above 
Figures 3b and 4). Activists also argued for converting the non-odious debt to aid for 
development projects in deprived regions, and for recovering the assets stashed abroad by the 
rulers and their cronies. 
                                                 
8
 A study published by the GFI in 2010 (Drivers and Dynamics of Illicit Financial Flows from India: 1948-2008) 
“found that macroeconomic conditions as reflected in central government budget deficits and inflation policy did not 
appear to drive such outflows of [illicit] capital. Instead the GFI study found that while economic reform can be 
largely credited for driving faster economic growth, growth itself has not been inclusive and income distribution has 
become more skewed. The resulting proliferation of high net worth individuals drove illicit flows in the absence of 
an improvement in public and corporate governance. Moreover, another by-product of reform – namely trade 
liberalization – spurred an expansion of the traded sector relative to GDP. The resulting trade openness provided 
more opportunities for related and unrelated parties to misprice trade and shift billions of dollars in illicit capital 
from the country” (Kar and Curcio 2011: 32). 
9
 http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/50Years_Enough/50Years_Enough.html; 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/50Years_Enough/Dakar_Declaration.html 
10
 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2979/we-will-not-pay-the-debts-of-tyranny (retrieved 22jun2013); 
http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/17846.html (retrieved 10nov2013); 
http://www.thetunistimes.com/2013/11/campaign-to-cancel-the-odious-debt-of-tunisia-and-egypt-99653/ (retrieved 
12nov2013) 
11
 http://www.fsm2013.org/en   
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Integration with the World Market through FDI and Trade Liberalization 
 
 Foreign direct investment in Egypt and Tunisia had some positive features while it lasted, 
but it was often of questionable developmental value and too focused on energy production and 
export, as well as leaving these economies susceptible to externally-induced crises (Pfeifer 
2012a: 15-24). During the peak years of 2005-2007, FDI averaged an unprecedented 15 percent 
of GDP in Egypt and 13 percent in Tunisia. However, the wave of FDI was short-lived. As 
indicated in Figure 7a, Egypt experienced a dazzling rise in FDI from $237 million in 2003 to a 
peak of $11.6 billion in 2007, and a stunning drop by 45 percent from 2007 to 2010. FDI inflow 
to Tunisia reached a peak at $3.3 billion in 2006, then fell by a total of 54 percent from 2006 to 
2010 (Dhaman 2011a: Table 7; Dhaman 2011b).  
[Figs 7a and 7b] 
 One main argument for liberalization of FDI was that it would help raise total private 
investment to compensate for the desired decline in public investment. As seen in Figure 7b, FDI 
did grow as a share of investment, but as we saw in Figure 5 above, that did not increase total 
investment. Much of the inflow was for takeovers of existing enterprises. More than half of 
Egypt’s inflows of non-hydrocarbon FDI in 2007-2008 went into financial and other services, 
like the takeover by an Egyptian private bank by a Kuwaiti bank. Two Dubai firms, including the 
deeply indebted Dubai Group Holding company, committed over $3 billion to purchase a 35 
percent interest in Tunisie Telecom in 2006, accounting for 68 percent of total FDI from all 
sources to Tunisia in that year (UNCTAD 2012: 6-7), but provided no investment in new 
productive capacity and liquidated its share in 2011 in order to repay its creditors elsewhere. 
 A second argument for more FDI was that it would lead to the formation of new small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that would generate jobs. Most of Gulf-sourced 
investment favored mega-projects in real estate such as hotels, tourist resorts, and luxury 
shopping malls, and fully or partially privatized public works, such as ports, airports and utilities. 
These projects created temporary jobs in construction, but, except for tourism, few permanent 
jobs. In Egypt, a third of the 2007-2008 non-hydrocarbon flows went to manufacturing, mostly 
existing capital-intensive plants such as fertilizers and chemicals, nine percent went to real estate 
and construction, and just four percent to the labor-intensive tourism, agriculture and ICT sectors 
(Mohieldin 2008: 40-41).  
 Even where FDI put resources into labor intensive manufacturing for export, the quality 
of jobs and impact on the domestic economy were questionable. In Tunisia, most new jobs 
created in the late 1990s and 2000s were low-technology, low skilled, and low paying (Achy 
2011: 10-11). FDI tended to favor coastal locations for production of exports to be shipped back 
to the investor countries (Karray and Driss 2009), generated few forward and backward linkages 
with the domestic economy (Achy 2011: 15-16) and, in addition, pitted Morocco and Tunisia 
against each other rather than encouraging integration (Nicet-Chenaf and Rougier 2009). Where 
there was a positive effect of European FDI on technology transfer and TFP growth in Tunisia, it 
was confined mainly to the export sectors, neither spilling over into domestic intra-industry 
linkage nor stimulating local research and development, a “weakness in absorptive capacity” 
attributed to the decline in resources allocated to education in Tunisia and to “political choices” 
that “imply a fall of the quality of the formation of manpower” (Samet 2011: 393). As Figure 8 
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shows, value-added in manufacturing averaged a slightly lower percentage of GDP in the 2000s 
than it had in the 1990s. 
[Figure 8]  
 A third argument in favor of FDI was that it would diversify the host economies, but FDI 
to the energy sector in the Mediterranean remained important throughout the 2000s. “Energy 
security” for Europe was defined as diversifying sources of imports and transit routes away from 
dependence on Russia. To the consternation of its domestic critics, Mubarak’s regime 
“provide[d] attractive fiscal terms” for hydrocarbon exploration and production, becoming “a 
leading supplier of natural gas to the Mediterranean basin” in the 1990s and 2000s (Bahgat 
2009). Some 29 international oil and gas companies were operating in Egypt in 2008, focused on 
upstream exploration and production of oil and gas, transport via the Suez Canal, the SUMED 
pipeline and the natural gas grid, to downstream activities like oil refining and gas liquefaction, 
as well as distribution to both the domestic and export markets (Fattouh and Darbouche 2010: 
1119-1121 and 1124-1125). As shown in Figures 9a and 9b, fuel exports averaged about 10 
percent of Tunisia’s merchandise exports from 1994 to 2010, and 40 percent of Egypt’s (rising to 
more than half from 2005 to 2007). This process continued through the crisis years. European 
investors accounted for 70 to 90 percent of FDI to Tunisia in from 2008 to 2010, with energy 
absorbing 54 to 62 percent of total FDI. The hydrocarbon sector in Egypt absorbed from 27 to 66 
percent of FDI over the 2006 to 2010 years.  Among non-Arab sources of FDI, 59 percent came 
from Europe, with the UK alone supplying 38 percentage points, and the United States another 
23 percent (Dhaman 2011b).  
[Figs 9a and 9b]  
 As indicated in Figures 10a and 10b, Egypt and Tunisia showed significant growth in 
exports to the world overall and to Europe in particular from 1995 to 2006, following the 
establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and joining the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). However, their share of world and EU exports remained very small, as 
aggregate international trade had grown rapidly in that era. Their penetration of overseas markets 
in which their exports were competitive improved slightly, with Egypt’s index rising from 6.56 
percent in 1995 to 11.3 percent in 2006, and Tunisia’s rising from 4.42 percent to 7.72 percent, 
in contrast to Turkey, for example, which went from 13.53 percent to 27.07 percent in the same 
time period. Egypt and Tunisia were also weaker than Turkey in penetrating their own 
neighboring markets in the southern and eastern Mediterranean (Brenton and Walkenhorst 2010: 
582-583, Tables 4 and 5).  
[Figs 10a and 10b]  
 A study of trends over the period from 1998 to 2007 found that the EMP had indeed 
increased both FDI to and trade with Egypt, but had had little impact on the structure of 
production or overall level of investment and no impact on employment. The authors concluded 
that “a dynamic nexus between exports, domestic investment and income growth that would 
allow Egypt to rapidly narrow the income gap with its developed EMP partners thus remains to 
be established” (Saleh and Abouelkheir 2013). A study of the impact of the EMP on Tunisia for 
the 1975-2009 period found that both FDI and trade openness had helped promote growth, but 
that the distribution of benefits depended on the quality of human capital and financial 
development, in the case of FDI, and on the level of diversification and sophistication of exports, 
in the case of trade (Hassan and Anis 2012). A second study of Tunisia for the 1984-2011 period 
found that growth and openness increased inequality in income distribution, albeit mitigated by 
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human capital and financial development, but that higher inequality then became a drag on 
further growth (Wahiba and Weriemmi 2014).  
 Where positive impacts were found from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) on 
the exports of Egypt and Tunisia from 1995 to 2008, including “sophisticated manufacturing 
products… [such as] machinery and transport equipment,” they were attributed to Europe’s 
having changed the “rules of origin” regulation to “have allowed the integration of better 
quality/less expensive intermediate goods [from Europe] in production in North African 
countries, consequently enhancing the demand for these goods in European markets” (Bernassi 
et al. 2011: 256). Meanwhile, Tunisia had become stunningly dependent on the EU, which 
accounted for 73 percent of FDI , 76 percent of exports, 83 percent of tourism revenues, and 90 
percent of remittances in 2008 (Achy 2010: 11). 
 The IFIs attributed the slow growth of jobs to the need for even more neoliberal 
“reforms,” more liberalization of labor markets, more trade, more exports, and more FDI. 
However, it was the dearth of domestic investment and dependence on exports and FDI that 
transmitted the West’s economic crisis to Egypt and Tunisia from 2008 to 2010, exacerbating the 
problems of uneven regional development, poverty, inequality and precarious employment that 
were the heritage of the neoliberal regime. 
 
 
Uneven Development: the “Two Egypts” and the “Two Tunisias” 
 
 The problems of uneven development accompanying neoliberal programs were officially 
recognized when the UNDP inaugurated its annual Human Development Report in 1990, as a 
complement, if not a competitor, to the IFIs’ publications. The approach was based on “Growing 
evidence that did not support … the ‘trickle down’ power of market forces to spread economic 
benefits and end poverty…” and the “human costs of Structural Adjustment Programmes.”12 The 
UNDP’s Arab Human Development Reports, inaugurated in 2002,13 addressed “development 
challenges for the Arab region,” including a volume published after the 2008 crisis and just 
before the uprisings. These “challenges” included the quality of institutions and governance, 
development investment and investment in human capital, employment and unemployment, 
income and wealth inequality, poverty, and the impact of external trade and financial 
liberalization (UNDP 2009).  
 As a former head of the Arab Planning Institute put it at an international development 
conference in Cairo in 2003, globalization may lead to growth without development, so 
“Policymakers need to forge a domestic growth strategy, relying on domestic investors and 
domestic institutions” to resolve conflicts arising from increased integration with the world 
economy (Ali 2005: 60). As the 2000s wore on, independent researchers increasingly found that 
neoliberal stars Egypt and Tunisia did not have a coherent “domestic growth strategy” and that 
inequitable dispersion of the benefits and costs of growth were leading to new developmental 
dilemmas. The following examples of that research weave the story of the underside of 
neoliberalism.  
 
                                                 
12
  http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/origins 
13
 http://arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/huma_development/arab-human-development-report-
2003-building-a-knowledge-society.html 
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 The Built Environment in Egypt. With 80 percent of Egypt’s population living in cities – 
in the mid-2000s, about 13 million in Cairo alone – there was growing scarcity of affordable 
housing and urban services. Because the reformed, liberalized state was no longer supplying 
adequate infrastructure or building public housing, the weakly regulated residential real estate 
market bifurcated into two sectors, luxury developments (with a surplus of 10.5 million units 
held mainly as investments) versus informal construction of three or four story apartment 
buildings lacking in sanitary facilities and sound foundations (Denis 2008: 32-35). One 
catastrophic result was the collapse of a cliff at the edge of the Muqattam Hills district that 
buried many homes and their occupants in September 2008.  
 A critique of the Cairo 2050 urban development plan, adopted by the Mubarak regime 
with the support of international capital and the enthusiastic endorsement of Egyptian real estate 
moguls, argued that allegedly “modern” cities like London, Singapore and Dubai were 
unrealistic and highly damaging models for replacing Cairo’s densely populated and largely 
informal residential areas. While enriching the already-privileged developers, the plan would 
displace inhabitants and destroy neighborhoods that had developed organically to serve the 
interwoven threads of residence, work, education, transportation and community that make life 
viable for poor and lower middle-class citizens. Citizens resisted fiercely and demanded that 
government instead provide much needed services to these existing communities and construct 
affordable housing with full services for new communities in now underutilized desert parcels, as 
was done with proven success for Ismailia starting in the 1970s (Tarbush 2012). 
 A review of three decades of World Bank development projects in both urban and rural 
areas of Egypt found that little had changed in the way that these communities functioned. While 
the Bank had designated over 80 percent of its $3.9 billion portfolio for built-environment 
projects as of 2010, including affordable housing, electricity generation, sanitation, solid waste 
management, household natural gas connections and transportation, the primary beneficiaries 
were private companies and wealthier individuals, while poorer communities benefited little. In 
one infamous example, the traditional self-organized private-sector zabaliyeen system of solid 
waste collection and management for Cairo, Alexandria and Giza was replaced in the late 1990s 
with long-term contracts awarded to multinational firms. The firms added collection fees to 
residents’ electricity bills to enforce timely payment, but provided services that most residents 
found much less satisfactory than the old system (Bank Information Center 2013). 
 The “false image of a stable, prosperous and progressive Egypt propagated by the state” 
and in World Bank reports was set in sharp contrast to surveys of ordinary people and direct 
interviews conducted in two poor communities, the Cairo slum of Manshiet Nasser and rural 
villages in the upper-Egyptian governorate of Menia. Based on fieldwork conducted from 2006 
to 2008, the researcher documented the ground-level experience of local inhabitants with 
inadequate education (e.g., illiteracy of up to 30 percent and a falling school enrollment ratio), 
failing healthcare provision, growing unemployment and poverty, and disillusionment with an 
incompetent and disengaged state bureaucracy, corruption and electoral fraud (Ibrahim 2011). 
 
 Location of Investment and Public Services in Tunisia. Industrial employment grew 
fastest in Tunisia from 2000 to 2005 in those coastal regions that already had a competitive 
environment, a diversity of economic activities, modern public infrastructure and social services, 
and an urban culture with higher levels of human development.  Foreign capital preferred to 
locate in these regions, namely around Tunis, Sousse, Monastir and Sfax, where they could 
specialize efficiently in products to be sent back to their home countries. Thus did FDI entrench 
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regional developmental disparities, and while government programs had made some difference 
in vocational training, infrastructure investment, and fiscal incentives in other regions, it was not 
enough to correct the imbalance with the coastal regions (Karray and Driss 2009; Kriaa et al. 
2011). Unemployment in urban and coastal regions was about 7 percent  in 2008,  but 30 percent 
in Sidi Bouzid, home of citizen Mohammed Bouazizi whose suicide set off the uprising.  
 As one journalist summed it up, investment in infrastructure had been concentrated in the 
coastal and Sahel regions from the time of French colonialism. Bourguiba and Ben Ali added 
tourism and manufacturing and devoted 65 percent of public spending to these regions. In 
consequence, public services, such as road building and maintenance, trash collection, and access 
to internet and mobile phone services were all less available in the hinterland. The interior 
governorates had twice the national rates of illiteracy and unemployment, and half as many 
medical facilities as the coast, requiring the residents of Sidi Bouzid, for example, to travel 140 
kilometers to Sfax for medical treatment (Joyce 2013).  
 Gafsa, a phosphate mining district in the south where the enterprise had been privatized 
and investment languished, had an unemployment rate of 40 percent in 2008, with one-fourth of 
families in poverty (Usher 2011). This was the region where labor strikes took place in 2008, 
garnering wide and militant support from other labor organizations, including middle-class 
professionals in education and healthcare, and in other regions. The actions went on for months 
and were brutally suppressed by the government, but galvanized the movement that would feed 
into the uprising of 2010-2011. 
 
 Maternal Healthcare. Both Tunisia and Egypt had put resources into improving the health 
of their populations over the 1980-2010 period, as evidenced by national level data on increases 
in the human development index overall and health indicators in particular. Egypt’s HDI value 
rose from 0.452 in 1980 to 0.644 in 2010, and Tunisia’s rose from 0.45 to 0.698. Egypt’s life 
expectancy at birth (LEB) rose from 62.1 years to 73.0 over the same period, while Tunisia’s 
rose from 62.1 to 74.3 (UNDP 2011). These national rates, however, obscured significant 
disparities among regions and between classes in access to health services, especially for women 
and children.  
 In Egypt in 2008, a pregnant rural woman was about half as likely as an urban woman to 
receive prenatal care or to have an assisted delivery, and she was more than three times as likely 
to give birth at home. In addition, the degree of such deficits was clearly and negatively 
correlated to socioeconomic status. In Tunisia, access to assisted deliveries for pregnant women 
improved significantly in all regions over the 1994-2006 period, but greater Tunis and the north-
east and center-east regions showed the biggest change. By 2006 less than one percent of 
deliveries were non-assisted in Tunis, down from 11 percent in 1994, while they were still 29 
and 22 percent, respectively in the least-favored regions of Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid (Boutayeb 
and Helmert 2011: 6-7). 
 
 Inappropriate and Ineffective Policy toward Agriculture. In the 1990s and 2000s neither 
overall economic growth nor agricultural sector growth alone reduced poverty in the Arab World 
(Ali 2005; Kheir-el-Din and Al-Laithy 2006) as most of the benefits went to wealthier, land-
endowed households. The majority of low-income households in rural Egypt and Tunisia had 
little access to land and earned most of their money income from wage labor and non-
agricultural activities. Furthermore, the share of public expenditure on agriculture had declined 
from 2000 to 2007, decreasing by 2.5 percent per year in Tunisia and 6.1 percent in Egypt, to just 
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1.5 percent of total public spending in Tunisia and 0.8 percent in Egypt in 2007 (Breisinger et al. 
2012: 20-24). What was missing in Egypt in the mid-2000s to correct this imbalance, beyond 
increased investment and extension services to agriculture, was to “build assets for the poor and 
support demand for these assets,” to improve provision and targeting of social services and 
education, to raise agricultural producer prices and the wages of unskilled workers, and to 
provide transfers to poor families to “reduce their risk” (Kheir-el-Din and Al-Laithy 2006: 23-
28). 
 Research on agriculture in Tunisia in the 2000s, even when the researchers were 
sympathetic to the potential of liberalization to improve rural livelihoods, found negative 
impacts. The World Bank’s program to reform and liberalize agriculture exacerbated existing 
inequalities, by increasing concentration of land ownership in rich farmers’ hands, privatizing 
cooperatives under control of rich farmers, and promoting agriculture for export, even though the 
EU did not liberalize its imports of agricultural goods (Gana 2012, World Bank 2013). One 
analyst projected that Tunisian agricultural exporters would benefit from increased trade with 
Europe when Europe reduced its domestic agricultural support policies, but poorer agricultural 
households in Tunisia would be hurt because of low competitiveness on international markets 
and national policies that depressed producer prices (Chemingui 2011). As of 2005, agriculture 
in Tunisia accounted for 13 percent of GDP and 16 percent of the labor force, and had generated 
25 percent of new jobs from 1997 to 2001, but was given short shrift in the national Five-Year 
Plan for 2007-2016, with little attention to its needs for water, energy, and extension and 
financial services (Chebbi 2010). 
 
 
Multidimensional Poverty 
 
 Poverty, in both income and human development terms and in its regional variations, was 
a subject of intensive study and debate in Egypt from the 1980s to 2000, including issues of 
access to productive resources, education, healthcare and decent employment (Ikram 2006). As 
per capita GDP rose by 2.6 percent per year from 1999/2000 to 2004/05, per capita expenditures 
fell by 1.4 percent, a pattern that may have been linked to unfavorable shifts in income 
distribution, insufficient mobility from low-value added jobs (e.g., in agriculture) to higher 
value-added jobs (e.g., in manufacturing), and low sectoral productivity growth (Kheir-El-Din 
and El-Laithy 2006: 8-9, 16, 27-28).  However, what really shocked researchers looking at trends 
in the 2000s, was that poverty rose even though growth accelerated and other macro indicators 
were positive, and worsened in Upper Egypt in general and among the rural agricultural 
population in particular. The proportion of the population below the national poverty line rose 
from 16.7 percent in 2000 to 19.6 percent in 2005 to 21.6 percent in 2009.
14
   The growth of that 
population was accompanied by a large vulnerable population just above the poverty line that 
would be quickly and negatively affected by any decrease in growth, rise in unemployment or 
increase in the prices of necessities.  
 Other factors affecting the rise in poverty in Egypt in the 2000s were ineffective targeting 
of aid to low-income groups and faulty calculations of the poverty line and, thus, of who was 
eligible for assistance. Based on direct fieldwork in seven poor governorates in 2009 in both 
upper and lower Egypt, including some urban regions, one researcher found, first, that the food 
subsidy program was “fairly inefficient” in targeting the lower income groups, especially in rural 
                                                 
14
 World Development Indicators, accessed 8/26/14 
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areas, and, second, that the social assistance program was not adequate to cover the minimum 
necessary basket of commodities for the lowest income groups. Furthermore, neither program 
was well targeted on the governorate level (Korayem 2013). Another project based on direct 
fieldwork in Cairo indicated that the poverty line was underestimated in urban areas, yielding 
artificially lower official rates than rural areas, because the actual costs of necessities faced by 
the majority of the urban population that lived in informal neighborhoods were significantly 
higher than the prices included in the consumption package that defined the national poverty line 
(Sabry 2010).   
   Late in the game, the World Bank began to recognize the problem of chronic poverty in 
Egypt. Before the uprising, a bank study acknowledged the limited accomplishments of the anti-
poverty Social Development Fund that it had introduced in Egypt in 1991 along with the 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program, ERSAP (Abou-Ali et al. 2009). In the 
immediate aftermath of the uprising, Bank researchers found “persistent internal poverty 
dynamics,” that “31 million (around 40%) were poor or near poor” in 2008/2009 and that 
“between 2004/2005 and 2008/2009, extreme poverty and absolute poverty actually increased” 
(World Bank 2011). 
 Standard international measures of poverty, even when broken down by urban/rural or 
regional categories, failed to provide an accurate picture where national-level data were 
unreliable or misrepresented and did not reflect inequitable access to social services or 
vulnerability to shocks like unemployment and food price inflation.
15
  World Bank published 
data tended to repeat national poverty rate reports uncritically, for example, a 2005 publication 
about Tunisia’s “successful socioeconomic development” stated in its executive summary,  
Rapid economic growth made possible a remarkable improvement in social indicators and a 
decline in the poverty rate from 40 percent in 1970 to 4 percent in 2000; the remaining poverty is 
predominately [sic] rural. But if the vulnerable population just above the poverty line is included, 
the percentage of the poor would increase by another 6 percentage points to over 10 percent. 
Addressing vulnerability and rural poverty remains a priority (Hassan 2005: 1-2).  
 When World Development Indicators were adjusted after the uprising to take account of 
misrepresentations by the Ben Ali regime, the poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty 
line was revised to 32.4 percent in 2000, 23.3 percent in 2005, and 15.5 percent in 2010, not 
including the vulnerable population just above the poverty line.
16
   Tunisia’s national poverty 
rate still seemed to have fallen over the decade, but the actual rate was much higher in 2010 than 
the original figure cited for the year 2000, and the “vulnerability and rural poverty” problems had 
not been solved by relatively high overall growth or public policy in the 2000s. 
 The correlation between regional underdevelopment and poverty in Tunisia was clear by 
2010, before manipulation of poverty lines and rates was exposed. In 2005, the region of Greater 
Tunis and other more privileged regions were recorded as having poverty rates of less than 2 
percent, while Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid, and Kairouan were given rates of just under 12 percent. 
After the recalculations of 2011, the relative rankings of regions changed only slightly, with 
Greater Tunis and other coastal regions estimated at rates of less than 10 percent and Kasserine, 
Sidi Bouzid and Kairouan stunningly high at over 32 percent (Béchir 2011: 6; Béchir and 
Sghaier 2013: 7).  
 In parallel, the reconceptualization of “poverty” as a complex multidimensional problem 
beyond just money income was part of the UNDP-led project to meet the Millenium 
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 For a positive review of Tunisia’s accomplishments under Ben Ali, see Chemingui and Sánchez 2011. 
16
 The methodology is explained by Béchir and Sghaier 2013: 4-8. 
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Development Goals (MDGs). This approach helped to explain the wide variance in rates among 
regions and the persistence of poverty and “vulnerability” of the “near poor” in the face of 
overall economic growth (for Tunisia, Hamdene and Benhassen 2012; for Egypt, Berenger 
2010). For example, a supplementary indicator of poverty is child malnutrition, which reflects 
many nonmonetary variables as well as money income, such as access to healthcare, sanitation 
and other social services. Stunted growth in children less than 5 years old (as measured by height 
relative to age) was 9 percent in Tunisia as a whole in 2006, but 12.7 percent in the rural areas, 
and in Egypt as a whole it was 30.7 percent in 2008 and 31.7 percent in the rural areas. The good 
news was that stunting had decreased in both countries from the late 1990s, at a faster rate in 
Tunisia than in Egypt and at a faster rate in the rural areas than in the urban. However, these 
declines were much slower than growth in either per capita GDP or per capita value-added in 
agriculture, thus exacerbating inequality (Breisinger at al. 2012: 15-18). 
 
 
Multidimensional Inequality 
 
 In the 2000s, researchers tried to address the questions of a possible increase in inequality 
in the Arab Region, how effectively to capture and interpret the relevant data, and how to address 
the issue with appropriate public policy. Consumption expenditure was considered to be a more 
reliable indicator of the standard of living than income, because it was easier to measure from 
household survey data and it avoided the problem that in most Middle East countries upper-level 
incomes were difficult to gauge. In general, researchers agreed that the Arab region had had a 
moderate and stable degree of consumption inequality compared to other regions, with Egypt 
toward the lower end and Tunisia toward the upper end of the Arab range, due to the 
redistribution effects of public and private institutions (Ali 2009). However, the quality, 
accessibility and comparability of available data were questionable and research on the impact of 
liberalization and privatization was quite limited and inconclusive (Bibi and Nabli 2009). Figures 
11a and 11b, from World Bank data, indicate that there was even a decline in consumption 
inequality in the 2000s.  
[Figures 11a and 11b]  
 The UNDP offered two other ways of examining inequality. It pointed to the “large and 
increasing difference between household expenditure reported by surveys and national 
accounts.” The ratio of the former to the latter in the 1990s was 0.46 for Egypt and 0.71 for 
Tunisia. In the 2000s, the ratios had fallen to 0.39 for Egypt and 0.66 for Tunisia, apparently 
indicating that household “consumption surveys were missing the big spenders” (UNDP 2011: 
26-27. Another approach was to adjust for inequality in the various components that make up the 
human development index, yielding an “Inequality-Adjusted HDI” (the IHDI). For Egypt, the 
classically-measured HDI value for 2010 was 0.644, but the IHDI was 0.489, with the biggest 
component of the 24 percent loss coming from inequality in education. Tunisia’s HDI value in 
2010 was 0.698, while its IHDI was 0.523, with the largest component of the 25 percent loss 
coming again from educational inequality (UNDP 2011).  
 Popular perception of rising inequality was an important contributor to the uprisings, fed 
perhaps by more visible factors like growing regional disparities, chronic poverty, rising 
unemployment and informal work, rising prices for food, inequitable access to education and 
healthcare, and growing awareness of these social disparities through electronic media. In Egypt 
in 2010, the general literacy rate was just over 71%, with males at 83% and females at only 59%, 
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but there were more than 20 million internet users (who must be literate), ranking the country 
21st in the world, and 55 million cell phone users, which was 19th in the world (Reske 2011). 
Despite Tunisia’s vaunted reputation for having surged ahead in education, including of girls, in 
the Arab World, the big changes in expected years of schooling were achieved in the 1980s with 
a total addition of 2.2 years, and the 1990s with a total addition of 2.9 years, but slowed in the 
2000s to add just 1.3 years. As of 2010, the mean years of schooling of adults was 6.5, barely 
above the elementary level (UNDP 2011), even as the college-educated population grew more 
visible and more troubled. 
 Other dimensions of inequality were examined by micro-level studies, such as the 
inequities of life in the informal and poor neighborhoods of Cairo described above (Tarbush 
2012, Sabry 2010). A survey of street vendors, probably the most visible sector of the informal 
economy, in five governorates in Egypt in 2009 found that 35 percent were illiterate and 30 
percent were just literate or had only primary education, that 79 percent had daily sales of 200 
LE (about $33.00) or less, and that they worked under constant threat of confiscation or 
intimation or demands for bribes from the police and other officials (FEDA 2009). A study of 
bank data in 2010 examined the distribution of credit to various levels and types of business and 
the impact that had had on growth, inequality and youth employment. On one extreme, lending 
to politically-connected businesses was shown to contribute nothing to economic growth, but to 
increase both inequality and youth unemployment. On the other extreme, lending to SMEs 
promoted growth and reduced both inequality and youth unemployment, with trade-association-
linked businesses and state-owned enterprises falling somewhere in the middle. The sectors that 
showed the greatest potential for growth and employment were industry, agriculture, tourism, 
and construction but these had all received disproportionately small shares of bank credit (Abdel-
Baki 2012).  
 
 Shifting Wage Structures. A study of the relationship between earnings inequality from 
1988 to 2006 in Egypt and inequality of opportunity, meaning variables such as parents’ 
location, occupation and education,  found “levels of inequality of opportunity were fairly stable 
while earnings differentials widened markedly,” meaning that other factors must have become 
more important in increasing wage differentials. The author suggested that these other factors 
might be the “transition to a more market-oriented economy” and the slower “expansion of 
intermediate and higher education” after 1988 (Hassine 2011). Another study of wage 
differentials in Egypt found that, in 2006, 75 percent of manufacturing jobs were unskilled, but 
that disparities in wages could be explained by location (rural versus urban) and gender (women 
were 13 percent of the manufacturing labor force) as well as by skill level. The author argued 
that trade liberalization could benefit all manufacturing workers in industries in which Egypt had 
a comparative advantage, but that these benefits would be realized only with innovation to raise 
productivity and competitiveness to international standards (Zaki 2011). 
 Data gathered by Hashem (2010) for Egypt indicated that real wage growth in the public 
sector appeared to be significantly higher and more stable than in the private sector over the 
whole period from 1995 to 2007. However, the average rate of increase in the public sector fell 
about in half in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s, and the rate of increase in the private sector, 
which was at least positive on average in the 1990s (albeit volatile), was negative on average in 
the 2000s. This provides fodder for the IFIs’ argument that the public sector is overly protective 
of its workers, and that the labor market needs to be further liberalized. However, the fact that 
real wage growth in the private sector was a net negative over the 2000 to 2007 period implies 
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that forcing more workers into the private sector would put even more downward pressure on 
wages. Another study on wage trends and differentials in Egypt over the neoliberal era found that 
real wages fell from 1988 to 1998 and the wage scale became more compressed, that real wages 
rose from 1998 to 2006 but the wage scale became more unequal, and that real wages fell again 
from 2006 to 2009 even as the wage scale continued to become more unequal (Said 2012). ILO 
data confirm that average real wages economy-wide grew by a total of 16 percent from 1999 to 
2007, but also that productivity rose by 20 percent in the same years,
17
 which imply that the 
benefits of growth were going disproportionately to employers. 
 Analyses of the labor market in Tunisia during economic liberalization addressed similar 
issues. A study of the 1999 nation-wide survey of households affirmed that the market was 
segmented into privileged (“protégé”) and non-privileged sectors. In 1999, 82 percent of the 
labor force, and over 96 percent of the female labor force, was still employed in the formal 
sector. The non-privileged (informal-sector) workers were more likely to be rural, less educated, 
less skilled, in temporary or part-time or seasonal employment, and paid by the hour or the day 
or not at all, but they were also paid significantly less even when all other factors were held 
equal (Sboui 2006). Another researcher found wage compression in the early liberalization 
period, from 1972 to 1985, as the real minimum wage rose, but then relative stability in the wage 
structure from 1985 to 2002, while the real minimum wage fell back and then stabilized at about 
150% of its 1972 level. She concludes that trade liberalization, via a reduction in the effective 
rate of protection, influenced the trend by shifting the composition of demand for different types 
of labor (Ghazali 2009).  
 Another study of wage distributional shifts in Tunisia from the 1983-1995 period to the 
1995-2009 period (pre and post-trade liberalization),
18
 found that there were wide differences 
across sectors: the average annual real wage for the economy as a whole was 24 percent greater 
in the second period  as compared to the first, but 97 percent higher in agriculture, 36 percent in 
non-manufacturing industry, 9 percent in services, and only 4 percent in manufacturing (Ben 
Salha 2012: 21-29, 36, Table 2), a difference that he attributes to liberalization’s shifts in the 
demand for labor. Another consideration is that, as of the mid-2000s, the social contract was still 
in place, by which the trade union federation (UGTT), the employers’ association and the 
government negotiated wages. Agricultural wages had risen more than in other sectors because 
of that process over the previous decade.
19
  Furthermore, the “bargain” decreed that the real 
minimum wage was to increase annually to match productivity growth, buttressing the whole 
wage scale, and the economy-wide average real wage did increase by a total of 31 percent from 
1983 to 2009 (Ben Salha 2012: 15-16). However, as shown in Figure 6 above, GDP per 
employed person (productivity) had increased by twice that amount, a total of 67 percent from 
1983 to 2009,
20
  implying that workers’ bargaining power was eroding and the fruits of rising 
productivity were going mostly to employers, similar to what we saw above for Egypt.  
 
 Shifting Occupational Structures. In Egypt, the total formal labor force participation rate 
increased from 47.2 percent in 1998 to 52.4 percent in 2006. The male rate rose to 78.5 percent, 
fed by both young males entering the labor force for the first time, many of them trained in 
technical schools instead of traditional high schools, and a rising retirement age for older male 
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workers as social security coverage shrank and life expectancy rose. Women’s labor force 
participation rate in 2006 was 26.9 percent, drained by attrition of mostly college-educated 
women from the shrinking public sector, but fed by growth of jobs in textiles and paid labor in 
rural areas as family subsistence production decreased. The female share of textile jobs rose from 
15 to 30 percent in these years (Assaad 2007: 4-7, 9-11, 39), but the pay was very low, $180 per 
month for better-paid workers in 2007, as compared to the UN poverty line of $224 for a family 
of 3.7 persons (Agbarieh-Zahalka: 6-8). The process of privatization had driven the public 
sector’s share of employment down from 39 percent in 1998 to 30 percent in 2006 and the 
official unemployment rate declined from 11.7 percent to 8.3 percent. Some of that decline was 
absorbed as employment in the formal private sector rose to 10 percent, while the informal sector 
absorbed many of the displaced public workers plus 75 percent of new labor market entrants 
over those 8 years, coming to account for 61 percent of total employment in 2006 (Assaad 2007: 
1-2, 12-13).   
 In Tunisia, the total number of jobs increased by 62 percent from 1989 to 2007, with the 
smallest increase in agriculture (18 percent), the largest increase in services (97 percent), and an 
increase of 57 percent in industry, but job growth plunged after that.  The importance of 
education in this shifting occupational structure showed that the strategy of so many young 
people to stay in school, and perhaps get government jobs, was based on positive precedent. On 
one hand, the proportion of jobs for those workers with no schooling dropped from 33 to 13 
percent, and for those with primary education from 39 to 37 percent. On the other hand, the 
proportion of jobs for those with high school degrees rose from 24 to 36 percent, and for those 
with university degrees from 5 to 19 percent (Ben Salha 2012: 36). While the government sector 
had added almost 20,000 jobs per year from 1998 to 2006 (accounting for about 22 percent of 
employment),
21
 it created less than 10,000 per year from 2007 to 2010 (Achy 2011: 9). 
 
 Changes in Labor Law. In Tunisia, the bulk of jobs created by liberalization of FDI in 
enclave manufacturing was for low-skilled and low-paid workers, many of them female. The 
reformed labor law of 1996 reduced some protections for “privileged” workers by easing the 
terms of hiring and allowing the share of temporary contracts to increase, although the terms of 
firing were still relatively strict for permanent-contract workers, requiring advance notification to 
and authorization by tripartite committees of employers, workers and government officials. The 
shift to “fixed term” (temporary) contracts was shift. By 2001, 15 percent of the employed labor 
force held temporary contracts (Ben Jelili and Goaied 2010) and by 2010, more than half of all 
employees were on temporary contract, and they earned 25 to 40 percent less than their 
permanent-contract co-workers (Achy 2011: 10-11). 
 In Egypt, a new labor law in 2003 expanded employers’ rights to hire and fire with fewer 
restrictions, but labor was not allowed to reap the benefits from the other side of the law’s 
“bargain,” still denied the right to organize, to strike, and to elect its own independent leaders. 
Furthermore, privatization of public enterprises reduced the size of the public-enterprise labor 
force by 50 percent. The consequences were the undermining of working conditions, wages and 
job security, and the growth of the informal sector as the private sector did not expand 
employment for workers expelled from public enterprises. The much-heralded fall in the 
unemployment rate in 2000-2008 was mainly due to growth of the informal sector. These 
changes were major sources of grievance for organized labor, which mounted many job actions 
led by local militants.   
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[Figures 12a and 12b]  
 
 
Unemployment and Other Precarious Relationships to the Labor Market  
 
 Figures 12a and 12b show the pattern of total and youth unemployment in Egypt and 
Tunisia over the whole of the neoliberal period from 1990 to 2010. While the rates are 
chronically high as compared to other regions of the world, they were declining from 2005 to 
2008 in Egypt and from 1999 to 2008 in Tunisia, reflecting increased demand during the boom 
years. Of particular concern in the 2000s were rising rates of unemployment among university 
graduates, even as primary- and secondary-school rates were steady or falling, as shown in 
Figures 13a and 13b. Data were not available for Egypt before 2008, but the tertiary-educated 
share of total unemployment rose from 32 percent in 2008 to 40 percent in 2010. The data for 
Tunisia go back to 1994, when tertiary-educated unemployment was just 2 percent of the total 
unemployed, rising to 9 percent in 2004, on up to 26 percent in 2008 and 32 percent in 2010. 
Despite the fact that the proportion of new jobs created had risen for university graduates (as we 
saw above), the numbers entering the labor force still outpaced the rate of job creation. 
[Figures 13a and 13b]  
 Figure 14 shows unemployment rates for Egypt and Tunisia in 2010, both total and when 
dissected by age and gender. It is clear that youth rates are double the total rates, a pattern that is 
common around the world, but more severe in the Arab region than elsewhere. UNDP/ILO 
researchers estimated that the employment elasticity of real GDP growth was 0.45 for Egypt and 
0.32 for Tunisia over the period from 2000 to 2006 (UNDP 2009: Vol. 1: 33).
22
  The rate of 
sustained GDP growth needed just to keep the unemployment rate from rising would have to 
increase to 7.1 percent for Egypt and 10 percent for Tunisia from 2010 to 2020, until the pace of 
entry into the labor market by young people slowed down as the demographic hump was passed. 
In order to absorb new entrants and bring down unemployment to a "frictional" 3 percent, Egypt 
would need to create a total of 9.4 million new jobs over 10 years, while Tunisia would need to 
create one million.
23
  
[Figure 14]  
 The problem of high rates of unemployment in Egypt and Tunisia, and elsewhere in the 
Arab region, especially among the young and educated, was analyzed extensively in agency 
reports and by independent economists. Three main themes ran through explanations of this 
phenomenon. One theme emphasized overly protected workers and inflexible labor markets, a 
heritage of the state-capitalist era, and the willingness of youth, especially high school and 
college graduates, to queue for jobs in the still-protected but shrinking public sector in the 1990s 
and 2000s. A second theme stressed the nature of the educational system and its purported failure 
to prepare workers for the jobs available in the private sector. IFI-sponsored analyses tended to 
stress these first two themes, which put the onus of inadequacy on the supply side of the labor 
market (e.g., World Bank 2004). A third theme also examined the demand side of the labor 
market and the nature of the growth and investment over the period 1990-2010 (e.g., UNDP 
2009, ILO 2012). To the extent that the IFIs addressed the demand side, it was in the form of 
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support for SMEs and the call for more FDI as the main job creators. Other agencies and scholars 
incorporated programs to support SMES and attract FDI into larger planning strategies to effect 
changes in the nature of public as well as private investment to promote the demand for labor 
directly, including active labor market policies (e.g., Kheir-el-Din and Al-Laithy 2006, Kaboub 
2006).
24
   
[Figures 15a and 15b]  
 
 Vulnerable Employment. High rates of unemployment in the formal economy were 
logically related to the phenomena of vulnerable employment, self-employment, and informal 
employment.
25
  The 2009 survey of street vendors in Egypt, described above, illustrated the 
breadth and depth of this vulnerability. The work of Delavallade, also mentioned above, 
explained some of the motivation for enterprises, especially the smaller less-powerful ones, to 
operate in the “shadow economy.” In an analysis of informal economic activity in the MENA 
region, Egypt and Tunisia were found to have large informal sectors by every measure: 
respectively, 36 and 39 percent of GDP, 28 and 25 percent self-employed as a proportion of total 
employment, and 45 and 50 percent of the labor force not contributing to social security (Gatti et 
al. 2011: 8, Figure 3). Figures 15a and 15b show the levels of self-employment and vulnerable 
employment from 1994 to 2010. Given likely overlap between the two categories, it appears that 
between one-third and two-thirds of the labor force was not in any form of secure employment.  
 
 Migration. According to consular statistics, the stock of Egyptian migrants abroad in 
2009 was 6.5 million, about 7/10 of one percent of the population, of whom 74 percent were in 
other Arab countries. The stock of Tunisians abroad was 1.1 million, about 10.6 percent of the 
population, of whom 83 percent were in Europe (55 percent in France). The Tunisian emigrant 
population had grown at the stunning rate of 6.2 percent per year from 2001 to 2009, as 
compared to a population growth rate of 1.1 percent, and they were increasingly university 
educated  -- 23 percent of migrants in 2009 as compared to 8.6 percent in 1999 (Migration Policy 
Center 2013). Among Egyptian migrants, 54 percent had at least a high school degree, as 
compared to 30 percent of non-migrants, and about half had higher-status occupations in the 
professional, technical and managerial fields, while fewer than 10 percent were low-skilled 
manual laborers (Nassar 2008, p. 16-17, table 15).  
[Figures 16a and 16b]  
 Emigré workers provided benefits to the economy of their home country both by sending 
remittances to help support their families and when they returned with a greater accumulation of 
both human capital and investible savings (Nassar 2008: 8-10, 18; Binci 2012). Figures 16a and 
16b show that remittances in dollar terms surged in the 2000s, and that in 2010 they were 5.7 
percent of Egypt’s GDP and 4.7 percent of Tunisia’s GDP. However, since the financial crisis of 
2008, both the Gulf Arab countries and Europe have strained to reduce immigration from North 
Africa, and the prolonged crisis in Libya has driven Egyptian and Tunisian workers home from 
there. This made legal emigration more difficult and seems to have led to increased illegal, and 
often dangerous, efforts to migrate to Europe anyway (Boubakri 2013), a tragic outcome given 
the benefits of migration to both host and home countries and the growth of precarious 
employment at home. 
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Resistance to Neoliberal Political and Economic Transformation 
 
 The elitism of the neoliberal program was reflected not only in the growing power of the 
capitalist class, uneven development and inequality, but also in the denial of political and civil 
rights, the deterioration of labor rights, and the institutionalized and violent repression of dissent. 
Mounting resentment grew in the decade before the 2008 financial crisis, as middle class civic 
groups and the rank and file of the labor movement protested their treatment under the neoliberal 
arrangements in various forms of resistance.
26
 The crisis and recession of 2008-2010 showed 
clearly that the negative aspects of neoliberal transformation could no longer be denied. That 
both uprisings essentially began in 2008 with labor actions was no coincidence. The spread of 
massive textile strikes in Egypt to many other sectors and the growth of nation-wide support for 
the Gafsa mineworkers brought middle and working class movements into parallel streams 
flowing in the same direction and set the stage for the uprisings. 
 Educated youth, increasingly faced with unemployment or informal employment and 
pressure to migrate, were sophisticated about world standards of citizenship and political 
freedom, organized protests on campus, and linked into political networks through new media. 
Older middle-class activists, some veterans of banned nationalist or leftist parties, kept 
resurrecting repressed civil society organizations to raise new challenges to their governments. 
Electoral fraud led to almost complete elimination of any opposition in parliament. In Egypt in 
2010, ballot-box stuffing was caught on video and publicized on You-Tube. In the 2000s, Ben 
Ali’s regime sequentially repressed the pioneering Tunisian League of Human Rights, the 
Association of Tunisian Judges and the Union of Tunisian Journalists. In Egypt, demonstrations 
in support of the second Palestinian intifadah in 2000-2001 led to larger demonstrations against 
the U.S-led war in Iraq in 2003, followed by the emergence of the Kifaya movement with its 
manifesto in 2004 demanding the end of the state of emergency and condemning the regime as 
the guardian of US interests. In both countries, citizens were outraged by Mubarak’s and Ben 
Ali’s intention to turn their rule into family dynasties, the heirs being a son and son-in-law who 
were notorious members of the state/business elite. 
 At the same time, labor unrest burst out in new forms, in particular in response to 
privatization of state enterprises and “reform of the labor market,” a process that deprived 
workers of their traditional job security without yielding the promised freedom to organize, 
collectively bargain and strike. In Egypt most of this resistance was organized by local militants 
over the strong objections of the regime-dominated Egyptian Trade Union Federation. Over 1.7 
million protestors participated in almost 2000 different strikes, political gatherings, sit-ins and 
demonstrations between 2004 and 2008, giving rise to the April 6 movement in 2008, which 
supported labor’s demonstrations and strikes with nation-wide internet communication. Although 
the protests focused directly on economic issues, like being paid back wages and overdue 
bonuses, they articulated resistance against the consequences of liberalization and privatization, 
including the privileges accorded employers in the new labor law, the forced retirement of public 
sector workers with inadequate pensions, and the handover to foreign capital of core production 
facilities. This movement established the demand for a national minimum wage adequate to 
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support a family, tackled issues of freedom of speech, assembly and association, and created a 
“culture of protest” in Egypt that facilitated the public’s acceptance of the anti-regime January 25 
movement. However, the national ETUF leadership never wavered in its support of the regime.   
 In Tunisia, the national trade union federation (UGTT) leadership was also allied with the 
regime, but had a history of autonomy from and conflict with Ben Ali. Union leaders had at 
times been jailed or exiled for their opposition. In contrast to Egypt, the UGTT had the power to 
negotiate with the government and employers and periodically raise the minimum wage. The 
UGTT leadership did not support the miners’ strike in Gafsa in 2008, which went on for months 
despite violent repression. However, that strike was a prelude to the uprising because it garnered 
widespread support from professional unions of teachers, healthcare and postal workers that 
spread across the country. In December of 2010, the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi 
became focally important because it led to massive general strikes, not yet with UGTT approval, 
and helped to define the struggle against the regime in political as well as economic terms. By 
the end of December 2010, it had garnered popular support for the uprising in all major urban 
areas. In mid-January 2011, a few days before Ben Ali’s ousting and in contrast to the ETUF in 
Egypt, the UGTT leadership threw the organization’s weight behind the uprising, which helped 
to seal its success.  
 The uprisings and the ouster of Ben Ali and Mubarak were made possible by the 
coalescence of these two parallel streams representing working class and middle class interests. 
However, there were two critical elements missing in this coalescence. One was an overarching 
agreement for how to shape new political institutions that would guarantee civil and human 
rights. The second was a framework for an economic agenda to replace neoliberalism with a 
more equitable and sustainable development program. Without these, the uprisings likely would 
be followed by political turmoil and weak economic growth that would make it more difficult to 
negotiate new institutions to fill in the missing elements and that would leave an economic 
power vacuum that the IFIs were only too eager to fill. 
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Fig 3b. Debt Service, % Exports Goods, Services & Primary Income,  
Egypt & Tunisia, 1990-2010 
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Source: IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, November 2013: 53 
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Fig 4. Fiscal & Current Acct Balances, Egypt & Tunisia, 2000-2010 
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Fig 5. Gross Fixed Capital Formation, % GDP, Egypt & Tunisia, 1990-2009 
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Fig 6. GDP per Employed Person, Egypt & Tunisia, 1990-2010 
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Source: DHAMAN 2011: "Inward FDI Flows, 1970-2011, $US Mns, Current", and as % of Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation" 
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Fig 8. Manufacturing Value Added % GDP, Egypt & Tunisia, 1994-2010 
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Source: World Development Indicators, accessed 8/26/14 
 
 
Notes:    1. Change in Intensive margin is increase or decrease of existing products to existing markets. 
 2. Change in extensive margin is increase or decrease of new or existing products to new markets. 
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Fig 10a. Exports to World, Egypt & Tunisia, 1995-2006 
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Source: Brenton and Walkenhorst 2010, Table 2 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, accessed 8/26/2014 
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Fig 10b. Exports to EU, Egypt & Tunisia, 1995-2006 
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Fig 11a. Egypt Income Distribution,  2000-2008 
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Fig 11b. Tunisia Income Distribution, 2000-2010 
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Source: World Development Indicators, accessed 8/26/14 
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Fig 12a. Egypt, Unemployment, Total and Youth, 1991-2010 
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Fig 12b. Tunisia, Unemployment, Total and Youth, 1991-2010 
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Source: World Development Indicators, accessed 8/28/14 
 
 
Source: (1) ILO 2012: 141, Table A11 
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Total Male Female Youth Total Male Youth Female Youth
0
10
20
30
40
50
1994 2004 2005 2007 2010
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
To
ta
l E
m
p
lo
ym
e
n
t 
Fig 15. Self- and Vulnerable Employment, Egypt & Tunisia, 1994-2010 
EGY Self-Em EGY Vul EM TUN Self-Em TUN Vul Em
Pfeifer, Neoliberalism and Uprisings    40 
 
 
 
Source: World development Indicators, accessed 8/26/14 
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Fig 16a. Remittances, Egypt and Tunisia, 1990-2012, $US Bns 
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